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Burton: European Bankruptcy Policy

TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL
BANKRUPTCY POLICY IN
EUROPE: FOUR DECADES IN
SEARCH OF A TREATY
LESLIE A. BURTON"

As multinational trade has increased, so has the need for crossborder insolvency agreements. For forty years, the European
Community and European Union have attempted to agree on
cross-border insolvency procedures. The author explores the
history of these efforts, the policy issues which have made
agreement difficult, and the demise of the EUs best hope for a
cross-border insolvency agreement: the failed 1995 Convention.
Finally, she compares past and current proposals, and explains
why they are inferior solutions to the failed Convention.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The goal of bankruptcy or insolvencf proceedings is for one
forum to take control of all of a debtor's assets, and to
distribute them under a consistent set of rules which will
ensure that the debtor and all of the creditors are treated fairly
and equally.2 Cross-border insolvencies are becoming more

* Lecturer, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, California.
BA, magna cum laude, University of Portland (1976); JD, cum laude, Santa Clara Law
School (1979).
1. "Insolvency," rather than "bankruptcy," is the term used in most Englishspeaking countries. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Creating International Insolvency Law,
70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 563, 563 n.3 (1996).
2. Anne Nielsen et al., The Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat: Principles to
Facilitate the Resolution of International Insolvencies, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 533, 533 n.2
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common in these modern times of multinational corporations
and increasing cross-border business transactions. As a result,
a single insolvency filing can involve creditors and property
located in many countries, each of which has different
insolvency laws, affecting who is eligible to file, where the case
should be filed, which creditors will have priority, and whether
a liquidation or a reorganization is appropriate.
These
differences can thwart the purpose of insolvency. Further,
countries seeking to favor their own citizens or property may
refuse to recognize foreign insolvency proceedings, thus causing
inconsistent results for similar creditors who reside in different
countries.
Private international law has been unable to ensure equal
treatment of creditors across nationallines. 3 As a result many
countries, particularly in Europe, have looked to the concept of
a treaty or convention to resolve these issues. In fact, various
European countries have been struggling for more than 40
years to establish an insolvency convention. So far their efforts
have been unsuccessful. The reasons for the failure to reach an
insolvency convention are procedural as well as substantive.
Jurisdiction is one such problem. A multinational corporation
that has assets in one country, debts in another, and assets in
yet another, could choose to file insolvency proceeding in one of
a number of potential forums. The debtor could, for example,
file where it is incorporated; where it owns the most valuable
assets; where it owns any assets; where it owes the largest
debts; or where it owes any debts.
Another perennial problem arises from the conflict of laws.
Choosing a particular forum does not. necessarily determine

(1996), quoting Michael Bogdan, International Bankruptcy Law in Scandinavia, 43
INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 49,50 (1985). "[I]t would be better in nine cases out often that all
settlements of insolvent debtors with their creditors should be made in a single
proceeding, and generally at a single place . . ." Douglas Boshkoff, Some Gloomy
Thoughts Concerning Cross·Border Insolvencies, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 931, 939 (1994),
quoting John Lowell, Conflict of Laws as Applied to Assignments for Creditors, 1 HARv.
L. REV. 259, 264 (1888).
3. Ian F. Fletcher, International Insolvency: A Case for Study and Treatment, 27
INT'L LAw. 429, 433 (1993).
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which substantive law will apply to the insolvency proceedings.
If an insolvent corporation owing debts in several countries
were formed in one country, maintained offices in other
countries, and owned assets in other countries, which country's
laws would apply to the insolvency proceeding? If a security
interest were valid in the home country but not in the country
where the assets are located, which country's laws would
govern? If a debtor is "eligible" to file in one country but not
another, which country's laws would control?
Differences in national insolvency laws often reflect differing
political goals and cultural expectations.4 In France, for
instance, one of the main goals of an insolvency proceeding is to
preserve jobs,5 even to the detriment of creditors' rights. This
is far different from the German system, which gives the
balance of power to the creditors so they can maximize their
recovery.s The United Kingdom provides liberal exemptions,
especially regarding the "matrimonial home,'>7 while many
nations allow few if any exemptions. These differences are
compounded by each country's reluctance to turn over assets
located in its own territory to an insolvency proceeding in a
foreign jurisdiction. Which country's laws should govern the
resolution of these issues?
A European insolvency convention would establish policies and
procedures to resolve these problems. Yet no policy or treaty
exists among European nations.s This failure is not, however,
due to lack of effort.

4. Boshkoff, supra note 2, at 936.
5. Manfred Balz, The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, 70
AM. BANKR. L.J. 485, 491 (1996).
6. Id.
7. Boshkoff, supra note 2, at 937 n.28.
8. One exception exists: The Convention Between Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway, and Sweden Regarding Bankruptcy, Nov. 7, 1933, 155 L.N.T.S. 133 (1933)
(Nordic Convention). The Nordic countries historically have had similar traditions and
laws, making it somewhat simpler for them to enter into a treaty. Fletcher, supra note
3, at 437; Nielsen, supra note 2, at 534; Balz, supra note 5, at 491 n.2l. Like any
treaty, the Nordic Convention established rights and obligations only between those
countries that have ratified it, and does not apply elsewhere in Europe.
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This article begins with an exploration of the history of
European attempts (particularly by the Member States of the
European Union9 ) to reach an insolvency convention. Next, it
analyzes the problems that have prevented ratification of an
insolvency convention, and considers why such attempts have
continually failed. Finally, this article regrets the failure of the
European Union Convention 'on Insolvency Proceedings, which
offers the most realistic and viable solution to the European
insolvency dilemma, and urges the resurrection and·
ratification of the EU Convention. The EU Convention, agreed
to in theory by the fifteen EU countries, was signed by fourteen
of them before May 1996. The EU Convention was derailed by
the United Kingdom's eleventh hour refusal to sign it, as a
reprisal for the EU's ban on beef products in the wake of the
U.K.'s epidemic of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE, or
"Mad Cow") disease. Finally, this article discusses potential
alternatives to the EU Convention, particularly with a view to
their advantages and disadvantages vis-a-vis the EU
Convention.
II.

THE EARLY ATTEMPTS

A. THE EEC BANKRUPI'CY CONVENTION

Historically, each European nation had its own insolvency law,
which generally allowed liquidation (but not reorganization)
insolvency proceedings. 10
Each country's insolvency law
differed, from the definition of "insolvent"U to such issues as
9. The European Union (EU) was established by the Treaty on European Union
(Maastricht Treaty), Feb. 7, 1992, 31I.L.M. 247, by the Member States of the European
Communities (European Community for Coal and Steel, European Economic
Community, European Atomic Community), in order to create a closer union among
them. The European Economic Community (EEC) was established by the Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome), Mar. 25, 1957,298
U.N.T.S. 11. The EEC has been renamed the European Community (EC).
The
current EU Member States are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
10. Balz, supra note 5, at 491.
11. Germany uses a balance sheet insolvency test (which is based on a
determination of whether the debtor's debts exceed its assets). Balz, supra note 5, at
485. France uses an equity insolvency test (which is based on a determination of
whether the debtor is unable to pay its debts as they mature). [d. Some nations use a
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eligibility to file, the extent of "estate property" (Le., property
subject to administration in the insolvency proceeding), validity
of security interests, avoid ability of certain pre-insolvency
transfers, and the applicability of real estate, tax, and labor
laws. These differing laws created problems for cross-border or
multinational insolvencies.
The problems worsened as
increasing travel and trade between the European nations
resulted in increasing transnational debts and movement of
assets from one place to another.
In 1960, the European Economic Community (EEC) began to
make a concerted effort to address the problem of cross-border
Starting in 1963, a committee
insolvency proceedings. 12
working under the auspices of the Commission began drafting
a Bankruptcy ConventionP The committee's challenge was to
establish a procedure that would harmonize the Member
States' different laws and resolve the issues that arose.
The drafting committee considered two competing approaches
to dealing with international insolvency issues: the
territorialist approach and the universalist approach.
Under the territorialist approach, the courts of each country
would be limited to adjudicating the debtor's assets and claims
located within that country,t4 and would refuse to recognize
foreign orders from outside national borders. 15 A country
might wish to use a territorialist approach to guarantee that
the rights of its own creditors are adequately protected.
Carried to the extreme, however, this position would not allow
for any cross-border agreement recognizing a foreign insolvency
proceeding.

test of whether a debtor has committed an "act of bankruptcy," which does not
necessarily have to include any insolvency finding. Id. The United Kingdom and
France do not require that a company meet any insolvency test as a precondition of
filing an insolvency proceeding. Id. at 499.
12. Balz, supra note 5, at 489; Justice Council: EU Initials "Bankruptcy"
Convention, supra note 12. EUROPE INFORMATION SERVICE NO. 55, Oct. 19,
1995, available in LEXIS, International Law Library, ECNEWS File.
13. Justice Council: EU Initials "Bankruptcy" Convention, supra note 12.
14. Nielsen, supra note 2, at 533-34.
15. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 432.
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The universalist approach, in contrast, requires that each
country automatically recognize the authority of other
countries' bankruptcy proceedings. l6 Insolvency proceedings in
one country would have full effect over all of a debtor's assets
and creditors, wherever 10catedY An even more extreme
variant of the universalist approach is the so-called unitarian
approach, under which all countries would cede their authority
to one forum that would be responsible for overseeing the
entire insolvency proceeding, to the exclusion of any other
forum. IS Thus, rather than each country recognizing the other
countries' insolvency proceedings, one insolvency proceeding
would be established to handle all of a debtor's European
insolvency proceedings. The one forum would be given powers
which would supersede locallawsl9 such as those regarding the
priority or allowability of claims, ownership of real and
personal property, and avoidability of preferential transfers.
However, agreeing on which forum should govern has been
problematic.
In the 1960s the majority of European states already accorded
some degree of recognition to foreign proceedings, but differed
as to the amount and type of recognition they would give.20
None went so far as to embrace a true universalist, let alone a
unitarian, approach. A universalist approach, however, is
truer to the purpose of insolvency proceedings because it seeks
to bring all issues together in one forum that would treat all
creditors equally.
After examining the territorialist and universalist approaches,
the EEC committee on international insolvency adopted a
Draft EEC Bankruptcy Convention21 in 1970. The 1970 EEC

16. Balz, supra note 5, at 492. The Nordic Convention, supra note 8, is based on a
universalist theory. Nielsen, supra note 2, at 534.
17. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 433.
lB. Balz, supra note 5, at 492.
19. Nielsen, supra note 2, at 534.
20. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 433.
21. EC Doc. IIII721BO (1990). This convention was drafted under the authority of
article 220 of the Treaty of Rome: «Member States shall, so far as is necessary, enter
into negotiations with each other with a view to securing for the benefit of their
nationals ... the simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and
enforcement of judgments...." Conventions under article 220, like conventions under
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Draft utilized a radical full universality / unitarian approach.
It proposed a system under which a single international
insolvency law would govern all European liquidation
insolvency proceedings,22 and used uniform laws to determine
the rights of the debtor and its creditors, wherever in Europe
they might be. One liquidator would be responsible for
administering the insolvency both in his own country and
outside of it. 23 No ancillary or secondary proceedings were
allowed,24 meaning that once one country had jurisdiction over
the insolvency, no other country could conduct any separate
insolvency proceedings on its own.25 Of course, like any treaty,
the 1970 EEC Draft would apply only to signatory nations.
After the committee adopted the 1970 EEC Draft, several new
countries joined the EEC. 26 Due partly to the new Member
States' adverse comments, the committee made changes to the
EEC Draft that significantly diluted its uniform law provisions.
The new version was called the 1980 EEC Draft Bankruptcy
Convention. 27 Under the 1980 EEC Draft, one liquidator would
have direct responsibility for administering insolvency
proceedings inside and outside the country that appointed him.
Outside the country that appointed him, however, the
liquidator would have to resolve matters under applicable rules
of private internationallaw. 28 The 1980 EEC Draft also called
for the creation of "sub-estates" in those countries that

traditional international law, must be signed and ratified by all of the contacting
states.
22. EC Doc. III172!80 (1990).
23. Carl '!Jur, An Analysis of the 1980 Draft EEC Bankruptcy Convention, 109
INT'L Bus. LAw. 22, 22 (1982).
24. Explanatory Report to the EU Convention, supra note 65 on Insolvency
Proceedings, 35 I.L.M. 1223 (1996); Nielsen, supra note 2, at 539.
25. The Two Systems Governing International Bankruptcy, European Information
Service European Report, June 20, 1995, available in LEfUS, INTLAW Library,
ECNEWS File.
26. Between 1970 and 1980, three nations joined: the United Kingdom, Ireland,
and Denmark.
27. '!Jur, supra note 23, at 24.
28. Id.
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contained the 9.ebtor's assets, and allowed local creditors to be
reimbursed first from the local sub-estate.29
Even after having been weakened considerably, the 1980 EEC
Draft Bankruptcy Convention remained unpopular. Although
it was revised again in 1982, and yet again in 1984, the
Convention never gained enough support to be opened for
signature. 3o Criticism revolved largely around concerns that it
would be unworkable for one forum to administer one
centralized insolvency estate, given the enormous range of
differences in countries' insolvency laws.3l Some called the
Convention an "overambitious model'132 requiring an "overly
rigid centralization . . . unacceptable for most" European
countries. 33
The committee finally abandoned the EEC Draft in 1985.34
Negotiations were resumed in 1989 in a different form, known
as the European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings,
discussed in Part III below.
B. EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON CERTAIN INTERNATIONAL
AsPECTS OF BANKRUPTCY (ISTANBUL CONVENTION)35
In 1989 in Strasbourg the Council of Europe36 convened and
began to draft the European Convention on Certain

29.

The Two Systems Governing International Bankruptcy, supra note 25, at 11;

'IJur, supra note 23, at 24.

30.

The Two Systems Governing International Bankruptcy, supra note 25, at 6;

Balz, supra note 5, at 492.
31. Balz, supra note 5, at 492.
32. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 437.

33. The Two Systems Governing International Bankruptcy, supra note 25, at 13;
Justice Council: EU Initials "Bankruptcy" Convention, supra note 12.
34. Other complaints about the EC Draft included a fear that it discriminated
against those outside the community. One commentator referred to its "crudely
aggressive attitude toward non-member States." Fletcher, supra note 3, at 441.
35. European Convention on Certain International Aspects of Bankruptcy
(Istanbul Convention), opened for signature, June 5, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 165 (1991). Some
sources refer to this as the Strasbourg Convention. See, e.g., Balz, supra note 5, at 485;
Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of
Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457, 487 (1991).
36. The Council of Europe, founded on May 5, 1949, is an organization formed to
promote cooperation between the European countries. Most European countries,
including those who are not members of the European Union, are members. In 1990
the twenty members were: Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
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International Aspects of Bankruptcy.37 It ultimately proposed
a multilateral treaty that was known as the European
Convention on Certain International Aspects of Bankruptcy, or
the Istanbul Convention.
The Council of Europe commenced its work on the Istanbul
Convention during a period of great change in the law of
insolvency.
In the 1980s, many nations amended their
insolvency laws, expanded the use of reorganization
proceedings in addition to liquidation proceedings, and in some
cases allowed reorganization proceedings for the first time.3s
Ironically, at the same time the Council of Europe was working
towards harmonization, the individual countries were enacting
national law reforms that resulted in even less harmonization
among their insolvency laws.39
The Istanbul Convention rejected the maligned unitarian (one
forum) approach that had been so heavily criticized in the
earlier 1970 EEC Draft. Instead, it adopted a flexible approach
to the universalist theory.40 The central tenet of the Istanbul
Convention was that one main insolvency proceeding would be
opened in a centralized administrative forum in the country
that was the "center of . . . [the insolvent debtor's] main
interests."41 Like the EEC Draft Conventions, the Istanbul
Convention addressed only liquidating bankruptcies, and
provided that a liquidator appointed in the main forum could
move to protect assets located in another country.42 Unlike the
EEC Draft, the Istanbul Convention provided that to
administer the assets in the second country, the liquidator
must seek authority from that country, advertise his

Greece, Holy See, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and Switzerland. The Council of
Europe should not be confused with the Council of Ministers or the European Council,
which are organs ofthe European Union.
37. Istanbul Convention, supra note 35, art 4(1).
38. Balz, supra note 5, at 499.
39. [d. at 498.
40. Nielsen, supra note 2, at 540.n. 57.
41. Istanbul Convention, supra note 35, art 4(1). The Convention provides a
rebuttable presumption that this is the country of incorporation. [d.
42. Istanbul Convention, supra note 35, art. 10; Fletcher, supra note 3, at 438.
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appointment, and wait for two months.43 Also unlike the EEC
Draft, the Istanbul Convention provided that the main
proceeding need not be the only authorized forum; it could be
supplemented by secondary proceedings in any other country in
which the debtor had an "establishment.'!44 The Istanbul
Convention provided that secondary proceedings would be
administered under local law, thus resolving problems arising
from issues such as the validity of security interests.45
Under the Istanbul Convention, certain creditors (generally
those holding priority and secured claims) would be allowed to
file their claims in a secondary proceeding in their own
country, instead of in the main proceeding.46 Claims filed in
the secondary proceeding would be paid first from the assets
subject to the secondary proceedings. The balance of the assets
remaining would then be forwarded to the main proceeding,
where the other creditors could file their claims and be paid.47
Objections to this procedure focused on national laws of some
countries (e.g. France), which accord "priority status" to a large
number of claims in an insolvency proceeding, and thus allow
these creditors to be paid in full before any money is paid to
any other creditors.48 Consequently, in a proceeding involving
assets in France and assets in other countries, the French
creditors would be unfairly favored. Although the Istanbul
Convention did not resolve this problem, it did provide that the
ordinary, unsecured creditor who obtains partial payment of a
claim in one insolvency proceeding, may not participate in any
distribution from any other insolvency proceeding, until such
time as the other creditors have received an equal pro rata
portion of their claims.49
Despite its perceived improvements vis-a.-vis the earlier EEC
Draft, the Istanbul Convention was nonetheless criticized. One

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Istanbul Convention, supra
Istanbul Convention, supra
Istanbul Convention, supra
Istanbul Convention, supra
Istanbul Convention, supra
Balz, supra note 5, at 521.
Istanbul Convention, supra
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arts. 19-22.
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art. 22, 31; Balz, supra note 5, at 521.
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weakness of the Istanbul Convention was the ambiguity of
some of its central concepts, such as the terms "center of main
interests" and "establishment." These terms were not clearly
defined in the Convention, and thus were likely to lead to
forum shopping and disputes over jurisdiction. Further, the
Istanbul Convention relied on "indirect" jurisdiction, meaning
that although it contained rules for recognizing and enforcing
judgments, it did not impose any mandatory jurisdictional
rules,50 thus creating a further potential for disagreements.
Worse, the Istanbul Convention did not contain any
mechanism to resolve interpretation difficulties. The Council
of Europe - unlike the European Union - has no European
Court of Justice with jurisdiction to interpret provisions of the
Istanbul Convention. 51 AB a result, any ambiguities in the
Istanbul Convention would be subject to differing national
interpretations, with no mechanism for uniformity.
Paradoxically, the Istanbul Convention, which was meant to
lead to more harmony, would in fact lead to more diversity.
The Istanbul Convention's attempt to give countries some
autonomy to apply their own national insolvency law in the
secondary proceedings was thought to be unfair and to defeat
the purpose of insolvency proceedings, viz. administration of
the debtor's assets in one forum, and distribution to all
creditors equally under a uniform set of laws. The greatest
objections were to the Istanbul Convention's granting of an "opt
out" provision, under which nations would have the ability to
choose not to be bound by some of the Convention's
provisions,52 including the chapters most important to
universality. The opt-out provisions apply to chapter II,53
which establishes the circumstances under which a liquidator's
cross-border powers can be recognized, and chapter III,54 which
authorizes member states to maintain secondary proceedings.

50. Istanbul Convention, supra note 35, art. 4; Ian F. Fletcher, The European
Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings: An Overview and Comment with U.S.
Interest in Mind, 23 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 25, 29 (1997).
51. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 439.
52. Istanbul Convention, supra note 35, art. 40.
53. Istanbul Convention, supra note 35, arts. 6-15.
54. Istanbul Convention, supra note 35, arts. 16-28.
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By opting out of Chapter II, a country would be free to refuse to
recognize an out-of-state liquidator's cross-border powers. By
opting out of Chapter III, a country could refuse to relegate its
country's insolvency proceedings to "secondary" status.
By allowing countries to opt-out of the universality provisions
of the Istanbul Convention, its drafters enervated the
Convention. The Istanbul Convention's potential for achieving
diverse national rules was high,55 which defeated its
universalist purpose.
Because the "opt out" provisions
undermined the universalist provisions of the Convention,
some called it a "convention a la carte.'){;6 Others commented
that unlike the earlier "overambitious" EEC Draft, the Istanbul
Convention was not ambitious enough.57 In contrast to the
EEC Draft, which was too strong, the Istanbul Convention was
too weak.
The Istanbul Convention was opened for signature in Istanbul
in June 1990.58 In the end only six nations signed the Istanbul
Convention: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg,
and Turkey.59 None went so far as to ratify or otherwise adopt
it.60
Some nations did not sign because they were awaiting a new
European Union Insolvency Convention, which was expected to
be produced by a committee of the Council of Ministers that
had been convened the year before.61 Although it never became
law, the Istanbul Convention exerted a significant influence on
the EU committee and its Convention on Insolvency
Proceedings, discussed in Part III below.

55. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 439.
56. The Two Systems Governing International Bankruptcy, supra note 25, at 20;
Balz, supra note 5, at 494.
57. Id. at 490.
58. Istanbul Convention, supra note 35.
59. Id.
60. Justice Council: EU Initials "Bankruptcy" Convention, supra note 12.
61. Balz, supra note 5, at 492 n.30.
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III. EUROPEAN UNION CONVENTION ON INSOLVENCY
PROCEEDINGS
The European Union Council of Ministers62 viewed the absence
of a European insolvency treaty as a "shortcoming in the
completion of the internal market.'>63 Therefore in 1989 it
formed a working group to propose a Convention.64 In 1995
this working group produced the European Union Convention
on Insolvency Proceedings (EU Convention),65 which came the
closest to becoming a ratified multilateral treaty. It ultimately
failed as well, albeit for different reasons than those that
toppled the EEC Draft and the Istanbul Convention.
Like the Istanbul Convention, the EU Convention was
intended to utilize the principle of universality to create a
single, main insolvency proceedingB6 and to harmonize rules for
the administration of insolvency proceedings.67 Unlike the
Istanbul Convention, however, the EU Convention aimed to
allocate direct jurisdiction, and to encompass reorganization as
well as liquidation proceedings. The EU Convention's attempts
to cure problems raised in previous conventions had mixed
success.
A. NEW SOLUTIONS TO PERENNIAL PROBLEMS

Like each of its predecessors, the EU Convention attempted to
resolve the uncertainty regarding which law would apply in
international insolvency proceedings. The conflict of laws
problem arose from the existence of different national
62. The EU Council of Ministers is the principal law-making body of the EU. It is
distinct from, and should not be confused with the Council of Europe, supra note 36, or
the European Council.
63. Explanatory Report to the European Union Convention on Insolvency
Proceedings, supra note 24.
64. Balz, supra note 5, at 494. The working group operated in secret. The first
reports of its existence did not emerge until late 1991. EC: Talks Begin Over European
Insolvency Harrrwny, REUTERS TEXTLINE, ACCOUNTANCY AGE, Oct. 24, 1991
available on LEXIS, INTLAW Library, ECNEWS File.
65. European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings (EU Convention),
opened for signature, Nov. 23, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 1223 (1996). Many consider this
convention as a continuation or revitalization of the earlier EEC Draft Convention.
See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 3, at 439; Nielsen, supra note 2, at 540.
66. Explanatory Report, supra note 24; Nielsen, supra note 2, at 544.
67. Balz, supra note 5, at 495.
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insolvency laws reflecting different social and economic goals.
In France, for example, one of the main goals of a
reorganization proceeding is to preserve French jobs; in
Germany, the main goal is to allow the creditors to be made
whole. In France, whether the insolvency trustee can avoid a
pre-insolvency transfer is a question of insolvency law; in
Germany, it is an issue of civil procedure law. In some
countries, including the part of Germany which formerly was
East Germany (the so-called Neue Bundesliinder), the debtor is
entitled to a "fresh start" at the end of an insolvency proceeding
in the form of a discharge of the remaining balance of all
unpaid debts. But in most European countries, including the
part of Germany that was formerly West Germany, no
discharge is available.68
An example will illustrate this concept: A French company
employing many French citizens may owe money to creditors
who reside in Germany. In a reorganization proceeding, the
French would argue that the company should remain in
business because many French jobs are at stake, while the
Germans would argue that the company should be liquidated
so that creditors can be paid immediately. The East German
creditors would not be able to continue to pursue the debtor for.
payments after the bankruptcy was over; the West Germans
would. The EU Convention seeks to harmonize these laws by
adopting a modified universality theory, blending a "framework
of member state cooperation" with a recognition of the "unique
aspects of member state's laws.'>69

68. Bernard Schollmeyer, The New European Convention on International
Insolvency, 13 BANKR. DEV. J. 421, 437 (1997); Boshkoff, supra note 2, at 936. Under
reforms to the German bankruptcy law that will take effect in 1999, discharges will be
available to all German debtors. Schollmeyer, 13 BANKR. DEV. J. at 437.
69. EU Moves Toward the Creation of a European Convention, EUROWATCH,
April 15, 1996, available on LEXIS, INTLAW Library, ECNEWS File. The modified
universality theory was not the preferred approach of the Commission, which would
have liked to have seen a convention based on the idea of one single insolvency
proceeding (i.e., the unity principle). Bankruptcy Convention, COMMISSION OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES RAPID PRESS RELEASE, Sept. 26, 1995, available on
LEXIS, INTLAW Library, ECNEWS File.
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The EU Convention's solution was to establish one set of
insolvency procedures with community-wide effect.70 Like the
Istanbul Convention, the EU Convention would allow an
insolvent debtor to file insolvency proceedings at its "main
center of interests.'171 For individuals, that is presumed to be
the domicile; for a corporation, it is presumed to be its place of
incorporation. These presumptions, however, are rebuttable.72
Unfortunately the EU Convention like the Istanbul
Convention - does not provide a comprehensive definition for
the term "main center of interests.'1'13 The EU convention also
defines the term "establishment" in a way that commentators
believe is likely to give rise to arguments over interpretation?4
Thus, the same danger that existed under the Istanbul
Convention persists under the EU Convention: disputes and
litigation over the location of a debtor's center of main
interests. 75 It does seem, however, that tests applied to resolve
other conflict of laws situations or to interpret jurisdiction
under other conYentions, should provide some guidance.
Assuming for the sake of discussion that there is no dispute
over the location of the debtor's main center of interests, the
EU Convention provides that an insolvency proceeding filed
there would be the "main" proceeding and must be recognized
in the other countries. 76 The law of the main forum provides
the source of law governing the insolvency proceedings77 (with
minor exceptions explained below). Under the EU Convention,
the law of the main insolvency forum will determine who is

70. ED Convention, supra note 65, art. 4(1); Schollmeyer, supra note 68, at 422.
71. ED Convention, supra note 65, art. 3(1).
72. ED Convention, supra note 65, art. 3(1); Explanatory Report, supra note 24;
Schollmeyer, supra note 68, at 426.
73. Fletcher, supra note 50, at 36.
74. Fletcher, supra note 50, at 38. Establishment is defmed as "any place of
operations where the debtor carries out a non-transitory economic activity with human
means and goods." ED Convention, supra note 65, art. 2(h).
75. Few Practitioners' Tears for EU Insolvency Convention, EUROPE
INFORMATION SERVICE NO. 2201, Feb. 22, 1997; available on LEXIS, INTLAW
Library, ECNEWS File.
76. ED Convention, supra note 65, arts. 3(1), 16(1).
77. ED Convention, supra note 65, arts. 3, 4; Balz, supra note 5, at 508-09.
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eligible to file an insolvency proceeding. 78 For example, if an
attorney files a personal insolvency proceeding in Germany,
France would have to recognize the proceeding,79 even though
attorneys are not eligible to file insolvency proceedings under
French law. The main insolvency forum also would govern
which property is "estate property," wherever it may be
located. 80 Estate property will be administered in the main
insolvency proceeding.81
In the preceding example, the
liquidator would be able to act in France as well as in
Germany,82 including physically removing the debtor's assets to
the country in which the main proceeding is pending.83
Therefore, a German debtor's assets in France would be
property of the insolvency estate in Germany. The main
insolvency forum would be the source of law for any avoiding
powers given to the liquidator. 84 Thus, a liquidator in one
forum could use that forum's avoiding laws to pursue recovery
of a preferential transfer from a creditor in a different forum.
The proceedings' in the main insolvency case would be
automatically recognized by all other states.85
These provisions in the EU Convention are reminiscent of the
best parts of the EEC Draft. This universalist treatment seems
calculated best to satisfy the main purpose of insolvency
proceedings, viz. to consolidate assets and debts in one forum
which will treat all creditors equally.
Nonetheless the EU Convention excludes certain issues from
its scope. The excluded issues are of a kind which the drafters
thought were better covered by conflict of laws principles,

78. EU Convention, supra note 65, arts. 27-38. The EU Convention by its terms
excludes insurance companies, credit companies, and investment companies from
eligibility to file insolvency. EU Convention, supra, art. 1(2). Although some countries
(including Germany) vehemently objected to these exclusions, most felt that these
industries would be sufficiently covered by pending EU directives. Schollmeyer, supra
note 68, at 425; Justice Council: EU Initials "Bankruptcy" Convention, supra note 12.
79. Balz, supra note 5, at 514.
80. The term "estate property" includes all property of the debtor.
EU
Convention, supra note 65, art. 27; Schollmeyer, supra note 68, at 422.
81. EU Convention, supra note 65, art. 27.
82. See EU Convention, supra note 65, art. 18.
83. EU Convention, supra note 65, art. 18(1), (2).
84. EU Convention, supra note 65, art. 4(2)(m).
85. EU Convention, supra note 65, art. 16(1); Schollmeyer, supra note 68, at 422.
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including the validity of security interests86 and issues
regarding sales of property under a reservation of title,87 both
of which will be determined by the laws of the situs of the
property. To resolve issues regarding the rights of secured
creditors, as well as the practical problems inherent in
liquidating assets from a distance, the EU Convention, like the
Istanbul Convention before it, authorizes secondary
proceedings to liquidate some assets locally.88 Secondary
proceedings, which can be brought in any country in which the
debtor has an "establishment".s9 would have effect only in that
particular country.90 Secured creditors can use secondary
proceedings to protect their interest in collateral,91 and the
insolvency administrator can use secondary proceedings if he
fmds that the use of local law to collect on a particular asset is
more favorable to the insolvency estate.92
These provisions for main and secondary proceedings eliminate
some of the problems inherent in the "one forum" (unitarian)
approach to universality, as employed by the EEC Draft.
Secured creditors' expectation interests, in particular, mandate
that rights in assets pledged as collateral should be determined
locally, at the situs of the collateral, when the validity of
secured interest is governed by local law. Unsecured creditors
by definition have no claim to the debtor's assets and should
not be concerned with where those assets are liquidated.
Applying a universal law to unsecured creditors seems
reasonable in light of the goal to provide equal treatment for
such creditors.
Applying a universal law also requires that countries not be
allowed to "opt out" of any part of the convention. Although the
EU Convention borrowed many concepts from the Istanbul
Convention,93 it eliminated the latter's principal weakness,

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

EU Convention, supra note 65, art. 5; Schollmeyer, supra note 68, at 422.
EU Convention, supra note 65, art. 6; Schollmeyer, supra note 68, at 438.
EU Convention, supra note 65, art. 3(2).
Id.
Id.
Balz, supra note 5, at 520.
Id.
The Two Systems Governing International Bankruptcy, supra note 25, at 22.
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which was that it allowed countries to "opt out" of some of its
universality provisions.
Although the EU Convention's
drafters discarded the Istanbul Convention's unity theory as
impractical,94 they declined to allow any country to "opt out" of
any of the provisions of the Convention. The drafters believed
that "[t]he requirements of fairness ... militate in favor of
plural, but properly coordinated, administrations.'>95 Thus the
EU Convention far exceeds the Istanbul Convention in its
promotion of universality.96
In contrast to the Istanbul Convention, the EU Convention
relies on direct jurisdiction.97 It establishes mandatory uniform
jurisdictional rules that must be followed by all states. Any
pre-existing national laws on jurisdiction are supplanted.98
This provides a stronger basis for jurisdiction than the
"indirect jurisdiction" proposed by the Istanbul Convention, so
IS more likely to result in a truly international insolvency
system.
The EU Convention also has an important feature that the
Istanbul Convention lacked: a forum to interpret it. The EU
Convention authorizes the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to
interpret the Convention with binding effect on all
signatories. 99 The EU Convention further authorizes the ECJ
to give advisory opinions at the request of national courts.lOO
Litigation can be anticipated over the meaning of the EU
Convention because it would be the first of its kind in the EU,
and comments already have been made over the ambiguity of
some of its terms. Prudence dictates that a court be granted
the authority to hear these disputes.

94.
95.

Fletcher, supra note 3, at 440; Fletcher, supra note 50, at 28.
Fletcher, supra note 3, at 440.

96.
97.

[d.
[d.; Fletcher, supra note 50, at 28; Balz, supra note 5, at 504.

98. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 440; Fletcher, supra note 50, at 29.
99. EU Convention, supra note 65, arts, 43-46; Balz, supra note 5, at 528.
100.
EU Convention, supra note 65, arts. 44; Schollmeyer, supra note 68, at 27.
This provision is patterned on Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome. Balz, supra note 5, at
528n.224.
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B. THE FATE OF THE EU CONVENTION

The EU Convention seemed to have resolved most of the
troublesome issues that plagued past attempts to reach an
insolvency convention. When it was opened for signature on
November 23, 1995,101 prospects for a ratified insolvency
convention looked promising at last.
The EU Convention, by its own terms, established a deadline of
May 23, 1996, for obtaining the signatures of all of member
nations. 102 It also provided that the Convention would not be
effective, and could not be ratified, unless all fifteen Member
States signed it.l03 Twelve of the fifteen signed in November
1995. 104 The Netherlands signed in March 1996, and Ireland in
April 1996,105 bringing the total up to fourteen. As the deadline
for signatures approached, only the United Kingdom had not
signed; however, the Lords' Select Committee on European
Communities, which was studying the Convention, had
recommended that the United Kingdom sign it, which
commentators expected it to do. los
Despite expectations that the United Kingdom would sign the
EU Convention, however, it refused in the eleventh hour to do

101.
EU Convention, supra note 65, art. 49; Bankruptcy Convention, supra note
69; Justice Council: EU Initials "Bankruptcy» Convention, supra note 12.
102.
EU Convention, supra note 65, art. 49; Bankruptcy Convention, supra note
69; Justice Council: EU Initials "Bankruptcy» Convention, supra note 12.
103.
EU Convention, supra note 65, art. 49(3) states: "This Convention shall
not enter into force until it has been ratified, accepted or approved by all the Member
States of the European Union as constituted on the date on which this Convention is
closed for signature."
104.
Nielsen, supra note 2, citing 1909th Council Meeting - Justice and Home
Affairs, Brussels, 19 and 20 March 1996, REUTER EU BRIEFING, April 12, 1996;
EU / United Kingdom-European Convention on Insolvency Proceedings is Deadlocked,
REUTER TEXTLINE AGENCE EUROPE, May 24, 1996, available on LEXIS,
INTLAW Library, ECNEWS File.
105.
Nielsen, supra note 2, citing 1909th Council Meeting - Justice and Home
Affairs, Brussels, 19 and 20 March 1996, REUTER EU BRIEFING, April 12, 1996;
EU / United Kingdom-European Convention on Insolvency Proceedings is Deadlocked,
supra note 104.
106.
UK: Beef Row Thwarts Insolvency Law, REUTER TEXTLINE
ACCOUNTANCY AGE, May 30, 1996 available on LEXIS, INTLAW Library,
ECNEWS File; U.K Lords Backing for Insolvency Convention, REUTER TEXTLINE
ACCOUNTANCY AGE, April 18, 1996, available on LEXIS, INTLAW Library,
ECNEWS File.
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so. The United Kingdom refused to sign the EU Convention in
retaliation for the total beef ban,t°7 which the EU had imposed
on March 27, 1996, because British cattle were suffering from
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE, or "Mad Cow"
disease).108 Four decades of working toward a European
insolvency treaty thus came to a disappointing halt on the EU's
May 23, 1996, deadline.

IV. EXPLORING ALTERNATIVES
Despite the United Kingdom's sabotage of the EU Convention,
some alternatives remain. The alternatives fall into three
categories, discussed at length below.
First, the EU
Convention could be resurrected. Second, a multi-lateral treaty
could be concluded among the fourteen EU Member States that
have already signed the EU Convention. And finally, nontreaty methods could be used to fashion a solution to the
problems of cross-border bankruptcy.
A. RESURRECTING THE EU CONVENTION

The EU Convention itself contained no provision for extending
the May 23, 1996, deadline. lo9 Thus under its own terms the
EU Convention could not become law if it were not signed by
all 15 Member States by that date. Still, mechanisms have
been proposed by which the Member States could resurrect the
EU Convention.
The suggestions include: an agreement
between all fifteen Member States to extend the deadline;l1O a
special conference of the Council of Ministers to re-open the

107.
Id. The Convention was not the only casualty. The United Kingdom
maintained a "systematic reservation on all decisions and acts requiring unanimity."

EU: EU / United Kingdom - European Convention on Insolvency Procedure is
Deadlocked, supra note 104.
Commission Decision 961239IEEC, March 27, 1996; Have Mad Cows
108.
Trampled the Insolvency Directive to Death?, EUROPE INFORMATION SERVICE, No.
2134, May 25,1996, available on LEXIS, INTLAW Library, ECNEWS File.
109.
White-Knuckle Ride on Final Straight for Bankruptcy Convention,
EUROPE INFORMATION REPORT NO. 2133, May 22, 1996, available on LEXIS,
INTLAW Library, ECNEWS File.
110.
Have Mad Cows Trampled the Insolvency Directive to Death?, supra note
108.
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Convention for signature;lll and an intergovernmental
conference coupled with the Member States' unanimous
agreement to re-open the Convention.l12
In late 1996 Manfred Balz, chair of the working group which
proposed the EU Convention, confidently opined that the
Council of Ministers would act to re-open the Convention.l13
The United Kingdom, he predicted, would "come along when
enough British cattle have been incinerated and sufficient EU
moneys sunk into British agriculture,,114 Others, too, have
counted on the United Kingdom's contrition as a powerful force
in ensuring that the Convention becomes law.1l5 These
optimistic forecasts have so far proven incorrect. Although
Mario Monti, European Financial Services Commissioner, is
quoted in July 1998 as holding out the promise of further
efforts,116 neither the Council of Ministers nor anyone else has
taken any action to resurrect the Convention.ll7 It remains
officially dead.
B. CREATING A MULTI-LATERAL TREATY AMONG THE 14
SIGNATORY NATIONS

Even if the EU Convention itself cannot be resurrected, the
possibility remains that the fourteen countries that did sign it
prior to the deadline might choose to conclude a multi-lateral
insolvency treaty among them. 11s
So far this is mere
speculation, as no move has been reported among the fourteen
Member States to adopt a separate multi-lateral treaty.
Even if such a multi-lateral treaty were adopted, it might raise
more problems than it solved. Such a treaty would not be

111.
Id.
112.
European Convention on Insolvency Proceedings is Deadlocked, supra note
104.
113.
Balz, supra note 5, at 529.
114.
Id..
115.
Fletcher, supra note 50, at 34.
116.
Written Question No. 3450/97, 1998 O.J. 223, 17/07/19981 at 2; No
Progress Yet on Insolvency Convention, EUROPE INFORMATION SERVICE
EUROPEAN REPORT NO. 2290, Feb. 11, 1998, available on LEXIS, INTLAW Library,
ECNEWS File.
117.
No Progress Yet on Insolvency Convention, supra note 116.
118.
Schollmeyer, supra note 68, at 32.
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pursuant to the provisions of the European Union treaty, so
probably would not confer any jurisdiction on the European
Court of Justice. 119 It is far from clear that fewer than all EU
Member States can make a treaty which would confer
authority on the European Court of Justice to resolve disputes.
If the fourteen counties could not confer authority on the
European Court of Justice, the states would be left without a
mechanism for interpreting the treaty's provisions. And the
lack of a court to interpret treaty provisions, it bears repeating,
was one of the main objections to the Istanbul Convention.

C. OTHER ALTERNATIVES
Some European (and American) practitioners would rather not
see a convention (whether concluded by fifteen countries or just
fourteen). Doubting the efficacy of the EU Convention, they
complain that the many compromises in the EU Convention
reflected the "lowest common denominator" between nations.12o
They have suggested alternatives including voluntary
cooperation between nations, enacting individual state laws,
adhering to the Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat, and
adopting the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law's Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. These
alternatives are flawed, however, because each ofthem seeks to
accomplish some goals that can only be accomplished by a
convention.
1. Voluntary Cooperation Among Nations
Even before the EU Convention was drafted, there was an
·~"increasing tendency" of the courts in one country to recognize
the insolvency laws of other countries. 121 In light of this
tendency, it may be possible to allow international insolvencies

119.
Id.; Balz, supra note 5, at 529.
120.
Few Practitioners' Tears for EU Insolvency Convention, supra note 75.
EC: Talks Begin Over European Insolvency Hamwny, REUTER
121.
TEXTLINE ACCOUNTANCY AGE, Oct. 24, 1991, available on LEXIS, INTLAW
Library, ECNEWS File. See, e.g., Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International S.A,
infra note 123, and accompanying text.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol5/iss1/8

22

Burton: European Bankruptcy Policy

1999]

EUROPEAN BANKRUPTCY POLICY

227

to be administered by international cooperation between
members of the insolvency profession and the courtS.122
An excellent example is the very successful international
insolvency of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International
(BCCI).123 BCCI was successful because it was among those
few insolvencies in which the insolvent debtor actually
reorganizes and remains in business while paying a substantial
dividend to creditors.
BCCI was a British company which
operated 250 branches in 69 countries, held assets valued at
$23.5 billion located in 70 jurisdictions, and comprised three
corporate entities based in Luxembourg and the Cayman
Islands. 124 BCCrs controlling interest was owned by the
government of Abu Dhabi. 125 Against all odds, liquidators and
courts in the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, the Cayman
Islands, and the United States cooperated with each other and
successfully maximized the return to creditors, from an
initially anticipated ten percent, to a final distribution of forty
percent. 126

The initial distribution to the priority creditors was made in
the United Kingdom under British law.127 The funds were then
transferred to a court in Luxembourg, which distributed the
balance of the money to non-priority creditors under
Luxembourg law. 128 The creditors were given a vote as to how
payment would be made, and were paid pro-rata, without
regard to where they were located.129
The BCCI insolvency was a "remarkable triumph of ad hoc,
cross-border cooperation, accomplished despite the absence of

122.
Few Practitioners' Tears for EU Insolvency Convention, supra note 75.
Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No.2) (1992) British
123.
Company Cases 715 (C.A); Judgment of Jan. 3, 1992, District Court of Luxembourg,
Sixth Chamber (1431. 12P) (M. Welter); United States v. BCCI
Holdings
(Luxembourg), SA, No. CR 91-0655, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 676 (D.D.C. 1992).
124.
Id.; Fletcher, supra note 3, at 434.
125.
Id.
126.
Id. at 435.
127.
Id.
128.
Id.
129.
Id. at 436-37.
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any formal international provisions."130 As remarkable as this
accomplishment was, it succeeded in large part because the
stakes were so high and so much money was spent on fees for
accountants, attorneys, and liquidators. l31 If BCCl's assets had
been much smaller, or if no incentives existed for the creditors
or courts to cooperate, success would have been far less likely.
The problem with relying on cooperation to sort out the
implications of cross-border insolvencies is that it is unreliable.
If cooperation were working, we would not see experts working
for decades toward insolvency conventions. The soundness of
the "voluntary cooperation" alternative is disproved by forty
years of unsuccessful work on various insolvency conventions.
Depending on voluntary cooperation is akin to depending on
the kindness of strangers: it is a gamble, not a certainty, and
requires trust. The insolvency field has been "characterized by
extreme parochialism and noncooperation."132 Rather than
working together to assure that all debtors and creditors are
treated equally, countries generally are interested in aiding
their own debtors to the detriment of foreign creditors, or in
aiding their own creditors to the detriment of foreign debtors or
foreign creditors. Countries are too interested in protecting
their own citizens, policies, and sovereignty, to cooperate
readily in c'ross-border insolvency proceedings, unless they
have a strong incentive to do so.
Thus the voluntary
cooperation alternative is not realistic.
2. Enacting Individual National Laws

Individual countries might enact their own national laws to
guide their courts through cross-border insolvency
proceedings. 133 The national laws would have to specifically
cover cross-border insolvencies, whether the debtor or the
creditors are residents of that country, and establish specific

130.
ld. at 436.
131.
ld.
132.
Harold Burman et al., Introductory Note, United Nations Committee on
International Trade ,Law's Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 36 I.L.M. 1386,
1387 (1997).
'
Fletcher, supra note 3, at 441.
133.
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procedures. Further, the laws must grant the courts the power
to act in furtherance of those laws.
The United States is a model, insofar as it passed a specific
section of its own Bankruptcy Code, which gives foreign
liquidators certain powers to act in American bankruptcy
proceedings. l34 Manfred Balz, chairman of the EU Council
Group on Bankruptcy and author of the EU Convention,
believes that Germany will probably adopt the EU Convention
rules as its own German system of international insolvency
law, thus applying the Convention rules, to the extent possible,
unilaterally and without requiring reciprocity.135
Germany's elimination of any reciprocity requirement is
essential. One historical problem with the idea that each
nation can pass its own laws to deal with insolvency has been
that countries often impose a "reciprocity" requirement on each
other: a sort of "I will but only if you do too" mentality. Such
an approach offers no guarantee that the other country
involved in the cross-border proceeding will recognize the
proceedings occurring in the first forum. France, Belgium, and
Luxembourg typically have applied a reciprocity requirement
before recognizing other countries' laws.136
If other countries would follow Germany's lead, and impose no

reciprocity requirement, then individual national law could
provide a solution to the problems caused by cross-border
insolvencies. But even then, this solution would only work if
each country were to enact the exact same laws. Otherwise the
purpose of insolvency proceedings - equal treatment of
creditors - cannot be ensured. Enactment of identical national
laws is unlikely in light of Europe's historical lack of common
insolvency procedures.

134.
11 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1994) provides: "A case ancillary to a foreign
proceeding is commenced by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a petition under
this section by a foreign representative."
135.
Balz, supra note 5, at 530.
136.
[d. at 488 n.7.
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3. Adhering to the Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat
The Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat was drafted by a
committee of the International Bar Association's Section on
Business Law. The committee, justifiably fearing that a
convention would not be realized, began drafting the CrossBorder Insolvency Concordat in 1993, and approved the final
version in 1995.137 A concordat is neither a law nor a treaty,
but rather a set of principles that provides guidance.l3s The
Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat139 sets forth ten
principles 140 to be followed by parties and tribunals in
international insolvency proceedings.l41 Because it is neither a
law nor a treaty, but only a set of principles, the Concordat can
be implemented in insolvency proceedings only by court orders
and/or stipulations between various estate representatives. 142
In contrast to the EU Convention, the Concordat is not limited
to EU countries, but is intended to be implemented worldwide.

137.
Nielsen, supra note 2, at 537.
138.
"Concordat" is a term applied historically to agreements between a
national government and a religious group, in which certain principles are given
"eminence" but do not become law. Nielsen, supra note 2, at 536, citing WEBSTER'S
NEW WORLD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 471 (3d ed. 1993).
139.
International Bar Association Section of Business Law's Committee J
Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat (Concordat), Sept. 15, 1995, in Nielsen, supra note

2.
140.
The ten principles are: (1) primary responsibility in a single
administrative forum; (2) claims administration in a single administrative forum; (3)
liquidator may appear in any forum where an insolvency is pending, and creditors have
similar rights; (4) coordination between fora; (5) transfer of asset from local to main
insolvency proceeding; (6) liquidator may employ rules of plenary forum even though
those rules are not available in the main forum; (7) liquidator may employ voiding
rules of any forum; (8) each forum decides the value and allowability of claims before it
using a conflict of law analysis; (9) composition proceeding is not barred simply because
some of the fora do not provide for compositions; (10) prevents actions that would
destroy the reasonable commercial expectations of parties to contacts. Id.
141.
Cf UNIDROIT (ed.), Principles of International Commercial Contracts
(1994). UNIDROIT's principles are an ambitious proposal for the unification of
international contract law through a restatement-like set of neutral rules, issued by a
private working group of specialized practitioners and academics. Klaus Peter Berger,

International Arbitral Practice and the UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts, 46 AM. J. COMPo L. 129, 129-30 (1998).
142.
Nielsen, supra note 2, at 538. The Concordat has been implemented in at
least two international insolvency proceedings, although neither involved European
nations. One proceeding involved the United States and Canada; the other, the United
States and Israel. Nielsen, supra note 2, at 535.
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The Concordat utilizes a modified universality approach,
similar to that used by the EU Convention, but with more
flexibility.
Like the Istanbul and EU Conventions, the
Concordat prefers one central administrative forum as the
most efficient. But, unlike the "center of main interests" test
used by the Istanbul and EU Conventions, the Concordat
provides for filing the main insolvency proceeding in the
country that is the debtor's "nerve center."143 The Concordat
does recognize, however, that one main proceeding might not
always be possible or practical. Therefore it is flexible _enough
to allow for two or more plenary proceedings to be brought
concurrently, or for one main proceeding and one or more
limited proceedings to coexist. 144
The provisions of the Concordat differ from those of the EU
Convention with regard to administration of an insolvency
when more than one proceeding is pending. Unlike the
provisions of the EU Convention, which restrict the liquidator
to administering the insolvency under the laws of the country
where the main proceeding is pending, the Concordat's
prOVISIons allow the liquidator to use the insolvency
administration laws of any forum in which any part of the
insolvency is pending. 145
In addition, although the EU Convention restricts the
liquidator to using the voiding laws of the forum where the
avoidance action will be brought, the Concordat allows the
liquidator to choose between the laws of any forum in which
any part of the insolvency is pending when voiding
transactions. 146 If, for example, a debtor residing in Germany
is indebted to a creditor domiciled in France, and the French
company received a pre-insolvency preferential transfer, the
EU Convention and the Concordat provide different results.
The EU Convention would require the law of France to be used
in an avoidance action. The Concordat allows the liquidator to
choose to recover the payment under either French or German

143.
144.
145.
146.
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insolvency law. The Concordat thus discourages a debtor from
"forum shopping" in its choice of a main forum, because its
choice of main proceeding cannot thereby limit the liquidator to
the laws of that forum.
The Concordat's prOVISIOns, however, are subject to
international conflict of laws principles. The remedy sought by
the liquidator cannot be a remedy that would be inconsistent
with principles of international law. 147 Interestingly, the
Concordat offers an example, not using European countries as
might be expected, but using parties from Hong Kong and the
United States. 148 The liquidator of a Hong Kong company in
insolvency proceedings in Hong Kong might seek to use United
States law to avoid a transfer made to an American company in
the United States. This would be allowed under the Concordat,
as it would not be unexpected or unfair.
It would be
unexpected and unfair, however, to use United States law to
try to avoid a transfer between two Hong Kong companies. The
Hong Kong companies would not expect the law of the latter
country to be used to set aside a transaction which occurred in
the bank's own country, and thus this would not be allowed
under the Concordat. 149 The Concordat's drafters believed that
it was important to prevent uncertainty and the disruption of
reasonable commercial expectations that might hinder
international commerce. 150
The Concordat's rules on determining and paying claims are
more similar to those found in Istanbul Convention than in the
EU Convention. Like both of those two conventions, the
Concordat provides that secured and priority claims can be
determined on a local basis, through local proceedings (plenary
or limited), and that the surplus should be forwarded on to the
main proceeding, which then provides for pro-rata distribution
to all creditors. 151 The Concordat, like the Istanbul Convention,
also provides that if a claim is filed in more than one forum, it

147.
148.
149.
150,
151.

[d.
Concordat, supra note 139, principle 7; Nielsen, supra note 2, at 552.
[d.
Concordat, supra note 139, principles 8, 10.
Concordat, supra note 139, arts. 2, 4, 5.
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will be adjusted to assure that the claimant does not receive
more than its share of the pro-rate distribution. 152 The EU
Convention does not so limit claims. The Concordat's provision
is more consistent with the purpose of insolvency proceedings:
distribution of the debtor's assets under a consistent set of
rules which assures that all creditors are treated equally,
based on the percentage of claims filed in each forum. 153
The Concordat's flexible and pragmatic solutions are its main
advantages. Nonetheless, the Concordat suffers from a serious
weakness: it lacks the force oflaw. It is optional and cannot be
expected to be followed uniformly by all countries in all
situations. It ultimately depends on mutual cooperation, which
is always subject to political whims, reprisals, desires for
protection of nationals, and other factors. Thus the Concordat
is as flawed as other non-treaty solutions.

It may be many years before a multi-lateral treaty is adopted
in Europe. 154 In the mean time, solutions such as the
Concordat offer practical guidelines to those who wish to follow
them.
4. Adopting the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border
Insolvency
The rapid growth of international trade has led in turn to an
increasing number of cross-border insolvencies, which have
affected investment and trade around, the world.155 Attempts to
reach a treaty solution have failed repeatedly. Therefore, in
1993, the United Nations Committee on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL), in close cooperation with the International
Association of Insolvency Practitioners (lNSOL), began work
on a Transnational Insolvency Project. 156 UNCITRAL at first
considered drafting a treaty, but abandoned the idea because of
the historical difficulty of achieving international agreement in

152.
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154.
155.
156.
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insolvency matters.157 Instead, UNCITRAL directed its efforts
toward a model law. These efforts culminated in the Model
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, which was adopted by
UNCITRAL on May 30, 1997.158 In contrast to the Concordat,
the provisions of the Model Law will become law in those
nations that adopt it.159
.The Model Law aims to prepare a uniform standard for
recognizing foreign insolvency proceedings and facilitating
cooperation across the borders.16o It was intended to cover the
many situations in which local law does not authorize the local
courts to cooperate in any foreign insolvency proceedings.161 It
expressly empowers courts to recognize foreign insolvency
proceedings,162 and gives the foreign liquidator access to local
courts without having to engage in any diplomatic
formalities. l63 It not only empowers the court to cooperate
with the foreign proceeding,164 but also directs it to do so to the
maximum extent possible. 165
The Model Law imposes no limit on any country's jurisdiction
to commence or continue its own insolvency proceeding. Like
the Istanbul and EC Conventions, it uses the concepts of
"center of main interests" and "establishment."166 The debtor
may file its main insolvency proceeding in the country where
its main center of interests lies. Secondary proceedings may
be filed where the debtor has an "establishment." The courts,
however, must cooperate to coordinate the proceedings.167

157.
Burman, supra note 132.
158.
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law's Model Law on
Cross-Border Insolvency, 36 I.L.M. 1386 (1997)
159.
Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border
Insolvency, U.N. Commission on International Trade Law, 30th Sess., at 7, U.N. Doc.
AlCN.9/442 (1997).

160.
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Model Law, supra note 158, arts. 15-17.
Model Law, supra note 158, arts. 9-13, 23-24.
Model Law, supra note 158, arts.25-27.
Model Law, supra note 158, arts. 25,30.
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The Model Law gives standing to a foreign liquidator to bring
avoidance actions. The Model Law does not create any
substantive avoidance law, however but limits the types of
actions to those available to an insolvency administrator under
the law of the enacting country (as distinguished from actions
available to ordinary creditors).l68
The Model Law is very modest in its ambitions. It seeks not so
much to create a universal system of substantive insolvency
This article has
laws, but to effectuate cooperation.
demonstrated the difficulties of getting countries to agree on
insolvency laws. Still, the Model Law offers a better solution
than voluntary cooperation, or even the Concordat, because
once enacted, it would have the force of law behind it: a law
mandating cooperation.
The Model Law will only be effective in those countries that
enact it.169 UNCITRAL has the goal that the Model Law could
be enacted and be effective worldwide. Certainly it would not
be particularly helpful or worthwhile unless it were enacted by
many countries, and on the same terms. When enacting the·
Model Law, however, a state may modify or omit any of its
provisions. 17o This undermines the concept of universality. To
ensure fair and equal treatment of all creditors, universality is
the necessary ingredient in an insolvency policy. Similarly,
countries also may balk at adopting the Model Law because
they do not want to bind themselves where others are not
bound. True reciprocity and harmony can be guaranteed only
by a treaty, and not by any national law alone.

168.
169.
170.

Model Law, supra note 23.
Guide to Enactment, supra note 159, at 7.
[d. at 8.
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The Model Law has not yet been enacted anywhere.l7l Still,
some model laws have been widely accepted. Twenty-five
countries have adopted UNCITRAL's Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration.172 If the Model Law on
Cross-Border Insolvency obtains half the success of the Model
Law on International Commercial Arbitration, that will far
surpass the success of any other attempt to solve the problems
arising from cross-border insolvency proceedings.

v.

CONCLUSION

An EU-wide convention still offers the best chance for
harmonizing European insolvency laws, despite the problems
that have dogged efforts to conclude one. Countries do not
readily cooperate with foreign insolvency proceedings, owing to
their differing insolvency laws and desires to protect their own
citizens, assets, and sovereignty. Thus,.it is unwise to rely on
cooperation to ensure fair and equal treatment of debtors and
creditors alike. Enacting purely national legislation is not
efficacious and is fraught with reciprocity problems.

Only a Convention - and one without opt-out provisions, at
that - will be equally binding on all nations. The most recent
EU Convention, though not perfect, is the result of nearly 40
years' worth of cumulative effort, and still represents the best
available option. The European Union should find a way to
resurrect the European Union Convention on Insolvency
Proceedings and ratify it once and for all.
This convention still will not cover those international
insolvency proceedings that extend beyond Europe, or into

171.
Ironically the Model Law was passed in the United States by both houses
of Congress but became the victim of unrelated arguments, about amending the
consumer provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Conference Report, R.R. CONF. REP.
NO. 105-794, reprinted in Congo Rec. R9954-9985, at 9974-77 (1998).
172.
Note by the [UNCITRAL] Secretariat, Status of Conventions (U.N. Doc.
AlCN.9/428) (1996), available at www.smu.edul-pwinship/arb-21.htm.Klaus; Peter
Berger, The Implementation of the UNCITRAL Model Law in Germany, Mealey's
International Arbitration Report (Mealey Pub. Jan. 28, 1998), available on LEXIS,
INTLAW Library, INTLTR File.
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Europe from beyond. 173 As such multinational, cross-border
insolvency proceedings continue to increase, the EU may decide
to enter into treaty discussions with a wider group of nations.
The United Nations (and in particular UNCITRAL) may be
best equipped to accomplish this, when the time comes.

173.

EU Convention, supra note 65, art. 48; Balz, supra note 5, at 497.
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